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ABSTRACT 
The Northern Kyushu Torrential Rain in July 2012 killed 31 people and destroyed more than 2,100 houses. The 
maximum rainfall per hour and per 24 hours were recorded at 108 mm and 507.5 mm, respectively. It also 
caused extensive damage to the Tatsuta area in Kumamoto City. Some residents stayed at home in the flooded 
area and were rescued by boats or helicopters because an evacuation order was delayed by the local 
government. On the other hand, many residents evacuated in time. We surveyed this evacuation behavior, 
awareness of disaster prevention, and the social capital, etc. Next, we analyzed the factors in promoting 
evacuation on the flood and made the evacuation behavior model. As a result, it was indicated that the factors in 
promoting evacuation on the flood were to check the river conditions and to be advised to evacuate by their 
neighbors. Furthermore, it was made clear that social capital in the community affected the practical ability of 
disaster prevention activities. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
It rained hard in the Kumamoto and Aso areas of 
Kumamoto Prefecture and the western part of Oita 
Prefecture, Japan, for several hours from midnight to 
morning on July 12, 2012. Eight weather 
observatories recorded a historical high. The 
maximum rainfall per hour and per 24 hours were 
recorded at 108 mm and 507.5 mm at the Aso-
Otohime observation, respectively. This rain was 
named the “Northern Kyushu Torrential Rain in July 
2012” by the meteorological agency. The flood and 
the landslide caused by this torrential rain killed 31 
people and hurt 11 people. There were 1,175 houses 
flooded above the floor level and 1,019 houses 
flooded below the floor level in the Kyushu area. 
There were 363 houses totally destroyed, 1,500 
houses seriously damaged, and 313 houses partially 
damaged. 
The Shirakawa River rose in a short time and 
flooded in Kumamoto City on July 12, 2012. The 
Shirakawa River runs from the Aso area to 
Kumamoto city and is a Class A river. Its length is 74 
km. The households living in the basin of the 
Shirakawa River in Kumamoto City were ordered to 
evacuate at 9:20 A.M. by the local government. 
However, Tatsuta areas were already flooded at that 
time. Then, some households stayed at their home in 
the flooding area and were rescued by boats or 
helicopters. It was indicated that the evacuation 
order had been delayed. But it was difficult to judge 
an evacuation order at the same time that the local 
government was making sure of the dangerous area 
appropriately, because this torrential rain would 
cause serious damage widely. With this torrential 
rain, the need for autonomous evacuation by 
households themselves was made clear anew. 
Regarding the relation between a provider of 
evacuation information and awareness of 
evacuation, Asada, Katada, Okajima, & Kobatake 
(2001) indicate that people prefer sufficient time to 
evacuate to a fault of evacuation information. They 
also mention that the information from a public 
agency rather than the information from their family 
or their neighbors raises people’s sense of reality of 
disaster. On the other hand, Okumura, Tsukai, & 
Shimoaraiso (2001) indicate a possibility that a fault 
of an evacuation order causes “the effect of a person 
crying wolf.” Katada, Kodama, Asada, Oikawa, & 
Arahata (2002) indicate that just after recommending 
evacuation, it affected evacuation behavior whether 
or not people listened to an evacuation 
recommendation and checked the river conditions. 
They also indicate that the structure of a house and 
dangerousness of the evacuation route affected 
evacuation behavior after flooding. 
It is said that not only an individual but also a local 
community play a major role in awareness and 
behavior of disaster prevention. Matsumoto and 
Yabeta (2008) indicate that the person aggressively 
participating in common activities in a local 
community shows a strong tendency to continue the 
activities of disaster prevention. Haruyama and 
Mizuno (2007) indicate that the ordinary common 
activities in a local community promote active 
support during a disaster. Fujimi, Kakimoto, Yamada, 
Matsuo, & Yamamoto (2011) indicate that the social 
capital of a local community relate to awareness of 
disaster prevention in a local community. 
In this study, we analyze factors of promoting 
autonomous evacuation on the basis of a 
questionnaire survey about evacuation behavior 
during the flood on July 12, 2012. The above 
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research analyzed decision-making and evacuation 
behavior under real or imaginary evacuation orders 
provided by the local government, whereas the chief 
distinction of this study is to focus on actual decision 
making and autonomous evacuation behavior on the 
flood when evacuation orders were delayed by the 
local government. The past research was limited to 
the analysis of relations between a local community 
and activities of disaster prevention on a normal day. 
On the other hand, this study analyzes whether 
households’ participation level of common activities 
in a local community affected their evacuation 
behavior during a real disaster. This study also 
analyzes whether the difference of ordinary activities 
between the two local communities impacted the 
difference of their evacuation behavior during the 
real disaster. Therefore, the place of this study is a 
demonstrative study of the past research.  
2. AN OUTLINE OF QUESTIONNAIRE SURVEY 
The study areas of the questionnaire survey about 
evacuation behavior were Tatsuda-1chome and 
Tatsudajinnai-4chome in Kumamoto City. Both areas 
are located at a meandering point of the Shirakawa 
River and are low-lying areas. Both areas used to be 
an urbanization control area and agricultural land. 
Since the areas were designated as an urbanization 
area in 1971, many houses were rapidly built there. 
A hazard map of the study areas is shown in Figure 
1. It was forecasted that most of both areas would be 
flooded, and the actual flooded areas mostly 
corresponded with them. Both areas were flooded in 
1980 and 1990, and the simplified levees were 
raised 2 m after the 1990 flood. 
By a fact-finding survey in the study areas on the 
flood, the submerged roads were partly confirmed at 
a few minutes after 6:00 A.M., and the inundation 
started in the lower near the Shirakawa River at 
approximately 8:00 A.M. The present capacity of the 
Shirakawa River around the study areas is 1,500 
m3/s, whereas it was estimated that flood waters on 
July 12, 2012 ran more than 2,300m3/s. A lot of 
residents in Tatsuda-4chome failed to escape 
because of a muddy stream, and 82 people were 
rescued by helicopters or boats from the Japan Self-
Defense Force, the police, and the fire station. We 
did the questionnaire survey about awareness of 
evacuation and evacuation behavior on the flood in 
cooperation with Kumamoto City Hall on December 
8–9, 2012. There were 610 households living in the 
study areas on the flood. Of these, 211 houses were 
totally or seriously destroyed, and 309 houses were 
flooded above or below the floor level. Since most of 
houses in study area had some damage, all of the 
households had to escape on that day. Seventeen 
investigators visited them and heard about their 
awareness of evacuation and their evacuation 
behavior during the flood. The total respondents 
were 301 households. Approximately 100 
households from totally or seriously destroyed 
houses lived outside of the study area during the 
survey. The respondents living outside totaled only 
33 households because some households’ present 
address was unknown or had moved far from the 
study areas. Therefore, the rate of respondents who 
suffered from serious damage is slightly low. The 
summary of the questionnaire survey is shown in 
Table 1. 
 
Figure 1. Hazard map of study area 
 
Table 1. Summary of questionnaire survey 
Study Area Tatsudajinnai-4chome and Tatsuda-1chome,Kitaku, Kumamoto 
Date December 8th and 9th , ,2012 
Method of survey Visiting and asking questions 
Num. of household 
in study area 
Tatsudajinnai-4chome : 175 households 
Tatsuda-1chome : 435 households 
Num. of 
respondents 
Tatsudajinnai-4chome : 92 households 
Tatsuda-1chome : 209 households 
Summary of questions 
Personal attribute Sex, Age, Can or not evacuate by yourself 
Household attribute Num. of family, Year of living, Structure of house  
Evacuation behavior 
and awareness 
Change of awareness before/after flooding 
and evacuation behavior 
Acquisition conditions of information about 
weather and flood 
Understanding of  
social conditions in 
your neighborhood 
Conditions of commuting and going to 
school of neighbors, Evacuation conditions 
of neighbors, Business conditions of 




Experience of flood, possibility of flood of 




Association with your neighbors, 
Participation in common activities in local 
community, etc. 







Figure 2. Time series of flood risk awareness and evacuation rate 
 
 
Figure 3. Recognition of neighbors’ conditions (n = 288） 
Time series of flood risk awareness and evacuation 
rate are shown in Figure 2. Here, flood risk 
awareness has three stages. The first stage is 
whether the household thought about the flood, the 
second stage is whether the household was sure 
about the flood, and the third stage is whether the 
household decided to evacuate. The number of 
households who thought or were sure about the 
flood or decided to evacuate increased beginning at 
6:00 A.M. The evacuation rate also increased at 6:00 
A.M. Since the flood occurred early in the morning, 
many households were already flooded when they 
woke up. Then, many households were sure about 
the flood and decided to evacuate at the same time. 
We can also confirm this fact from their recognition 
of neighbors’ conditions before thinking about the 
flood on that day shown in Figure 3. More than half 
of respondents in both areas answered that they 
could not understand their neighbourhood social 
conditions. They did not have enough time to check 
them and were forced to decide an evacuation. By 
9:00 A.M., 60% of respondents decided to evacuate, 
but only 40% actually evacuated.; the remaining 
20% who decided to evacuate but were unable to do 
so. They then took refuge in the house and were 
rescued by the helicopters and the boats. Although 
we did the questionnaire survey in the afflicted 
areas, 30% of respondents did not try to evacuate. 
Some respondents among them did not experience 
damage from the 1990 flood and thought that this 
flood would not cause much damage since the 
levees had been raised. 
3. EVACUATION BEHAVIOR AND INFORMATION 
The decision-making process of the household who 
did not evacuate is different from the process of the 
household which decided to evacuate, but both of 
them could not evacuate during the flood. We 
wanted to pay attention to the fact that 40% of the 
households could evacuate. Then, we treated both 
as if they were households who did not evacuate. 
Therefore, we divided the samples into two groups, 
one is the sample of the evacuated household and 
another is the sample of the not-evacuated 
household. We tested whether there was a 
difference between the two groups’ acquisition 
conditions of the information about the flood disaster, 
evacuation, etc. The acquisition rates of the 
information by the means are shown in Table 2. The 
results of the t-test of difference between the two 
rates are also shown in the last column in Table 2. 
The number of households themselves is the largest 
in a check on the river condition. The difference 
between the two rates of a check on the river 
condition by households themselves is statistically 
other hand, the difference between the two rates of 
checking the weather conditions by themselves is 















































































Oneself 70% 82% 59% 4.13** 
TV・Radio 17% 19% 15% 0.77 
Internet 2% 2% 2% 0.21 
Relation etc. 6% 6% 6% -0.17 
Neighbors 12% 13% 10% 0.68 
Fire volunteer 3% 3% 3% 0.24 












 Oneself 32% 32% 31% 0.13 
TV・Radio 22% 17% 26% -1.87* 
Internet 3% 3% 3% 0.24 
Relation etc. 5% 7% 4% 0.86 
Neighbors 7% 7% 6% 0.36 
Fire volunteer 1% 2% 1% 0.70 









r TV・Radio 4% 2% 5% -1.05 
Internet 2% 2% 1% 0.17 
Relation etc. 2% 2% 3% -0.63 
Neighbors 6% 7% 5% 0.59 
Fire volunteer 3% 4% 2% 0.93 





Relation etc. 11% 14% 9% 1.24 
Neighbors 25% 31% 19% 2.34* 
Fire volunteer 10% 14% 6% 2.06* 
 
 
a. The relation between evacuation and a check on the river 
conditions 
 
b. The relation between evacuation and advice of evacuation 
Figure 4. Time series of evacuation rate in terms of a check on 
the river conditions and advice of evacuation 
at a time before and after the occurrence of the 
flood. For checking the weather conditions by 
television and radio, the rate of the not-evacuated 
household is significantly larger. They did not notice 
conditions outside of the house due to watching 
television. They also did not recognize their own risk 
due to receiving a lot of information about the 
disaster risk. All of the differences between the two 
rates about an evacuation order are not statistically 
significant because an evacuation order was delayed 
by the local government. There were few households 
who were advised by someone to evacuate—only 
36% in all. However, when households were advised 
to evacuate from their neighbors and fire volunteers, 
the rate of evacuation was significantly larger. It 
seems that the advice to evacuate promoted 
evacuation as the leading evacuee was regarded as 
important on an autonomous evacuation. 
As stated previously, the evacuated households 
used checking the river conditions by themselves 
and the advice of neighbors to make their decision to 
leave. Time series of the evacuation rate in terms of 
checking the river conditions and the advice of 
neighbors are shown in Figure 4. The final numbers 
of those who evacuated show that checking the river 
conditions by themselves was twice the rate of the 
not-checked household. The evacuation rate was 
also changed by whether or not the household was 
advised to evacuate. The average evacuation 
starting time of the checked household and the 
household advised to evacuate were 7:47 A.M. and 
7:39 A.M., respectively. These groups began to 
evacuate 10 minutes earlier than the not-checked 
households and 18 minutes earlier than the not-
advised households. The household that acquired 
this information tended to begin evacuating earlier. 
Next, we tested which item among awareness of the 
Shira River flood, preparedness conditions of 
disaster, and relationship conditions with local 
community affected the evacuation behavior. The 
scoring means of each item of the questionnaire is 
shown in Table 3. An awareness of the Shira River 
flood is scored to be higher as thinking the 
probability of flood to be high. For preparedness 
conditions of disaster, the score of prepared item is 1 
and not is 0. For relationship with the local 
community, each item is scored to be higher as 
closely relating. The mean of each item of the 
evacuated household and the not-evacuated 
household is shown in Table 4. The results of the t-
test of difference between the two means are also 
shown in Table 4. The evacuated household 
evaluated the probability of flood to be high.  
They also prepared the emergency kit and 
participated in an evacuation drill about the 
preparedness of disaster. For relationship with the 












































Table 3. Scoring means of each item of the questionnaire 
Probability of flood Certain :4, High probability :3, Medium probability :2, Low probability :1, Not at all:0 
Preparedness 
Have you read a flood hazard map and recognized a flood risk?  Yes :1, No :0 
Have you confirmed the evacuation route and place? Yes :1, No :0 
Have you prepared the emergency kits? Yes :1, No :0 
Have you participated in the evacuation drill? Yes :1, No :0 















 Complaint or worries Do you have any neighbors hear your complaints or worries? Yes :1, No :0 
Care Do you have any neighbors take care of you when you are sick? Yes :1, No :0 
Familiar with neighbors I have neighbors cooperate a living :3, Daily stand chatting :2, Only greeting :1，Not at all :0 
Acquaintance with neighbors Acquaintance with all neighbors :3, Half of neighbors :2, A few neighbors :1, Not at all :0 
Frequency of greeting Everyday :4, Once a week :3, Once a month :2, Once a year :1, Not at all :0 
Prevention of crime and fire Have you participated in the prevention activity of crime and fire? Yes :1, No :0 
Community learning Have you participated in protective activity of community history or culture? Yes :1, No :0 
Activation of community Have you participated in the activation activity of community? Yes :1, No :0 
Sports Have you participated in the community activity of sports or taste? Yes :1, No :0 
Community development Have you participated in activity of community development or community support? Yes :1, No :0 
 
to be familiar and acquainted with their neighbors 
and participated in activities of community 
development or community support. 
4. EVACUATION BEHAVIOR MODEL 
From the analyses of the foregoing chapter, 
checking river conditions, advice to evacuate, 
preparation of an emergency kit, participation in an 
evacuation drill, familiarity with their neighbors, 
acquaintance with their neighbors, and participation 
in activities of community development or community 
support are given as the factors that affected 
evacuation behavior. It seems that the 
characteristics of each area also affected evacuation 
behavior. Thus, Tatsudajinnai-4chome is 1, and 
Tatsuda-1chome is 0 as the area dummy variable. 
Four levels of forecasted depth of the flood in Figure 
1 are also treated as a variable from 1 to 4. The 
evacuation behavior model which decides whether 
or not each household in the study area will 
evacuate is estimated as possible explanatory 
variables which are the above variables. The 
estimated parameters are shown in Table 5.  
For factors relating each household, the variables for 
checking the river conditions and advice to evacuate 
are significant statistically. For the characteristics of 
each area, the variable of forecasted depth of the 
flood is significant statistically, but the area dummy 
variable satisfies only 10% significance. However, 
the area dummy variable is left as an explanatory 
variable from a viewpoint of area identification. 
Since the parameter of an area dummy variable is 
negative, the households in Tatsuda-1chome have a 
marked tendency to evacuate. All respondents in 
Tatsudajinnai-4chome live in a single-family house, 
while some respondents in Tatsuda-1chome live on 
the second floor or the third floor in an apartment 
house and they did not evacuate at that time. This is 
a reason of the above. The parameters of the 
forecasted depth of the flood on the hazard map, a 
check on the river conditions and advice of 
evacuation are positive, and the assumed conditions 
of these parameters are satisfied. 
 
Table 4. Comparison between daily activity of evacuated 
household and nonevacuated household 
  Evacuated n=121 
Not 
n=143 t-value 







s Flood hazard map 0.12 0.08 0.85 
Evacuation route and place 0.29 0.29 -0.08 
Emergency kit 0.22 0.12 2.23* 
Evacuation drill 0.19 0.10 2.11* 
















Complaint or worries 0.80 0.72 1.52 
Care 0.57 0.52 0.81 
Familiar with neighbors 2.26 2.07 1.88* 
Acquaintance with neighbors 2.02 1.83 1.64* 
Frequency of greeting  3.62 3.66 -0.49 
Residents’ association 0.70 0.70 0.05 
Prevention of crime and fire 0.16 0.12 0.89 
Community learning 0.13 0.10 0.67 
Activation of community 0.09 0.07 0.62 
Sports 0.35 0.27 1.31 
Community development 0.23 0.11 2.57** 
** 1 % level of significance, * 5% level of significance 
Table 5. Parameters of evacuation model 
Variable Parameter t-value 
Constant -1.82 2.73** 
X1:Area dummy -0.49 1.55 
X2:Expected flood depth on hazard map 0.31 1.79* 
X3:Dummy of checking river conditions 1.12 3.31** 





Num. of sample 
260 
** 1 % level of significance, * 5% level of significance 
80 
 
Figure 5. The evacuation simulation for food 
The evacuation rate during the flood on July 12, 
2012, was calculated from the simulation by the 
evacuation behavior model to check the 
reproducibility of it. The results are shown in Figure 5 
with the real rate from the questionnaire survey. The 
calculated rate of Tatsudajinnai-4chome is a little 
larger than the real rate, but the calculated rate can 
approximate the real rate on the entire area doing 
well. We tested how much the evacuation rate would 
be improved if all households check the river 
conditions and/or are advised to evacuate. First, we 
estimated the evacuation rate if all of the households 
checked the river conditions. The rate increased by 
10% throughout the whole area. Next, we estimated 
the rate if all households were advised to evacuate. 
It also increased by 10% throughout whole area. The 
rate of Tatsudajinnai-4chome was improved 
remarkably because many households in 
Tatsudajinnai-4chome were not advised to evacuate 
during this flood. Lastly, we estimated the rate if all 
households checked the river conditions and were 
advised to evacuate. In this case, 80% of the 
households in Tatsudajinnai-4chome and 58% of the 
households in Tatsuda-1chome would have 
evacuated. Therefore, it is made clear that the 
evacuation rate would have been 1.4 times larger 
than the real rate if all of the households would have 
checked the river conditions and were advised to 
evacuate. Since, in reality, it is dangerous to check 
the river conditions directly, it is desirable that the 
river conditions would be checked through the 
camera. 
5. EVACUATION BEHAVIOR AND COMMUNITY 
In the previous section, it was stated that that it is 
important to promote evacuation to advise to 
evacuate. Next, we will analyze the relationships the 
households who were advised to evacuate have with 
the local community. We divided the samples into 
two groups: one is the sample of the households 
who were advised to evacuate and the other is the 
sample of those who were not advised. Then, we 
calculated the mean of each item for the relationship 
with local community by group. The means and t-test 
results of the difference between the two groups’ 
means are shown in Table 6. It is indicated that 
mostly, the means of the households advised to 
evacuate were larger. The households advised to 
evacuate know their neighbors well and are a good 
mixer in their neighborhood. They tend to have a lot 
of friends who hear their complaints and worries. 
They also tend to participate in community learning 
and activities of community development or 
community support. With this, the households 
forming proper human relationships with their 
neighbors were advised to evacuate. 
It is made clear that advice to evacuate is useful in 
promoting evacuation, and the households advised 
to evacuate are close with their local community. 
Although  the  households in Tatsudajinnai-4chome 
Table 6. The relation between relationship with community and 








Complaint or worries 0.86 0.69 3.23** 
Care 0.60 0.51 1.25  
Relationship with neighbors 2.31 2.06 2.46** 
Acquaintance with neighbors 2.20 1.74 4.06** 
Frequency of greeting 3.64 3.65 -0.06  
Residents’ association 0.75 0.67 1.46 
Prevention of crime and fire 0.20 0.10 2.17* 
Community learning 0.16 0.08 1.87* 
Activation of community 0.07 0.09 -0.48  
Sports 0.33 0.30 0.57  
Community development 0.24 0.12 2.32* 
** 1 % level of significance, * 5% level of significance 














s Flood hazard map 0.13 0.08 1.21  
Evacuation route and place 0.23 0.31 -1.46 
Emergency kit 0.16 0.16 -0.01 
Evacuation drill 0.04 0.16 -3.59** 
















Complaint or worries 0.83 0.73 1.99* 
Care 0.56 0.53 0.40  
Relationship with neighbors 2.22 2.11 1.11  
Acquaintance with neighbors 2.01 1.85 1.46 
Frequency of greeting 3.50 3.71 -2.18* 
Residents’ association 0.81 0.63 3.40** 
Prevention of crime and fire 0.08 0.14 -1.82* 
Community learning 0.11 0.10 0.34  
Activation of community 0.07 0.08 -0.35 
Sports 0.30 0.30 -0.13 
Community development 0.12 0.19 -1.64* 

























and Tatsuda-1chome suffered almost the same 
damage from this flood, a lot of households in 
Tatsudajinnai-4chome failed to evacuate and were 
rescued by helicopters and boats. We tested 
whether the usual activity level of local community 
relates to evacuation behaviors during a disaster. We 
calculated the mean of each item regarding 
preparedness for a disaster and relationship with 
community by area. The means and t-test results of 
the difference between two areas’ means are shown 
in Table 7. 
Focusing on the items of preparedness for a 
disaster, the means of evacuation drill and fire 
volunteer in Tatsuda-1chome are larger. For the 
items regarding relationship with local community, 
the means of complaint or worries and residents’ 
association in Tatsudajinnai-4chome are larger. Most 
of the households in Tatsudajinnai-4chome live in a 
single-family house, while 10% of the households in 
Tatsuda-1chome live in an apartment. The 
households living in an apartment usually 
demonstrate a low rate of participation in residents’ 
associations, which affected the results. The means 
of frequency of greeting, prevention activities of 
crime and fire, and activities of community 
development or community support in Tatsuda-
1chome are larger. From these analyses, we 
assume that the usual activities of local communities 
involve the emergency activities which are advice to 
evacuate and leading the evacuation.  
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this study, we surveyed the evacuation behavior 
during the flood on July 12, 2012, in Tatsuda areas 
which suffered serious damage. Then, the factors of 
promoting an autonomous evacuation were 
analyzed. It is indicated that the factors that affected 
evacuation behavior in Tatsuda areas were checking 
the river conditions, advice to evacuate, preparation 
of an emergency kit, participation in an evacuation 
drill, familiarity with neighbors, acquaintance with 
neighbors, and participation in activities of 
community development or community support, from 
statistical point of view. The evacuation behavior 
model deciding whether or not each household 
evacuated was estimated as these factors 
considered the explanatory variable candidates. 
Consequently, the variables for checking the river 
conditions and advice to evacuate were selected as 
the explanatory variables promoting an autonomous 
evacuation. The evacuation behaviours during the 
flood were simulated by using the estimated model, 
and the evacuation rates were forecasted under the 
three scenarios. It is made clear that the evacuation 
rate will be 1.4 times larger than the real rate from 
the questionnaire survey if all of the households can 
check the river conditions and can be advised to 
evacuate. The usual activities of local communities 
lead the emergency activities which are advice to 
evacuate and the leading the evacuation. These 
results prove what the past research indicated—that 
the level of relationship between each household 
and the local community and the activity level of the 
local community affect their awareness level of 
disaster prevention. 
Both activation of common activities in local 
community and mutual acknowledgment among the 
neighboring households are indispensable for 
promoting an evacuation in an entire area by advice 
to evacuate during a disaster. On the other hand, 
from the evacuation behavior simulation, even if the 
households check the river conditions and are 
advised to evacuate, 35% of the households will not 
evacuate. It suggests the need for disaster risk 
communication which makes households living in the 
dangerous area recognize a disaster risk. It is 
rediscovered that daily practice of common activities 
in the local area is the key to constructing the 
disaster mitigation type society. 
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